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Abstract:  
This paper identifies recurring issues in the regulation of new technologies through an historical review of 
the risk management of automobiles in the 1800’s. Parallels are drawn between the regulation of early 
automobiles and that of the regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) today. It is found that many 
of the regulatory challenges facing UASs are analogous to those which faced the automobile industry 
more than a century and half ago and that the need for informed and objective decision making in policy 
development is reinforced. A systems engineering approach, based on general systems theory and 
decision-based design principles, is then proposed as a means for improving the objectivity, transparency 
and rationality in the risk management decision making process. An example risk management decision 
making is given within the context of a small UAS operating over a populated area. The results obtained 
from this case-study illustrate how even simple analysis can support the decision making process and 
highlights some of the potential challenges in the regulatory approach currently applied to UASs. 
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1. Introduction 
 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) or “pilot-less aircraft” are not a new technology. The first 
successful flight of a powered UAS occurred in 1918; just over a decade after the pioneering flights of the 
Wright Brothers (Newcome, 2004). However, unlike Human-Piloted Aviation (HPA), the limitations of 
available technologies (and perhaps a lack of foresight) hindered their ongoing development. The 
realisation of a potentially viable UAS industry has only come about through the availability of enabling 
technologies, in particular: digital processors and the Global Positioning System (GPS). The business 
case for UAS in a range of military and civil/commercial applications will continue to strengthen as the 
cost of development falls and their capability increases, a trend reflected in UAS market growth forecasts 
(Zaloga et al., 2007). However, there are a number of challenges that still need to be addressed before a 
viable UAS industry can become a reality. 
 History has shown us that some of the greatest obstacles facing the realisation of a new technology 
are not always technical in nature but are often related to its integration into Society. There are a number 
of political, economical and sociological issues governing the acceptance and integration of a new 
technology. One issue of particular importance is the management of any associated risks.  
 Society is becoming increasingly risk aware (Slovic, 1987) and as a direct consequence there is 
growing opposition towards the introduction of new technologies and their associated risks. The hazards 
of UAS operations present risks to a number of entities (i.e., people, environment etc) and it is the 
Authors’ belief that the greatest challenge facing the realisation of a safe, yet viable UAS industry is the 
development of effective strategies to manage these risks.  
 The progression of knowledge is an incremental process and it is through experiences (particularly 
failings), experimentation and historical observations that Society furthers its understanding in a 
particular field. Therefore, much insight into the issues concerning the risk management of new 
technologies can be gained through observing the risk management of previous technologies.  
 Many parallels can be drawn between the issues concerned with the risk management of “horse-less 
carriages” in the 1800s and those issues concerned with the risk management of “pilot-less aircraft” 
today. This leads to an interesting question: if it can be argued that there have been no significant changes 
in the fundamental behaviour of Society towards new technological risks; why has the science of risk 
management not addressed the recurring issues concerning new technologies? The following section, §2 
A Lesson in History? The Regulation of the “Horse-less Carriage”, explores some of these recurring 
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issues through a historical comparison between automobiles and UASs. The third section, §3 An 
Engineering Design Perspective, discusses the application of engineering design practices, based on 
general systems theory (Boulding, 1956) and decision-based design principles (Marston and Mistree, 
1997; Mistree et al., 1990), as one means for improving the objectivity, transparency and rationality in the 
risk decision making process. The approach assists in the characterisation of the decision scenario; 
providing boundaries of rationality to aid decision makers. A theoretical decision scenario of a UAS 
operating over an inhabited area is then used to illustrate how the application of engineering design 
principles can support rational decision making. 
2. A Lesson in History? - The Regulation of the “Horse-less Carriage” 
 It is believed that the inception of the “horse-less carriage” was on the sketch-pad of Da Vinci but it 
was not until 1769 that Nicolas Joseph Cugnot developed the first self-propelled steam driven vehicle 
(Flink, 1988). One year later, Cugnot developed a tricycle vehicle capable of carrying four passengers. 
Ironically, it is believed that in that same year Cugnot also became the first person to be involved in an 
automobile accident, when his steam-driven vehicle crashed into a stone wall (Fallon and O'Neill, 2005). 
It was not until the mid-to-late 1800s that steam-driven horse-less carriages reached a level of 
technological maturity that saw their increasing use on public roads. The development of the battery in 
1859 by Planté and its further refinement by Faure, marked the beginnings of the electric automobile. 
Electric automobiles were poised to overcome many of the frailties of their steam-driven counterparts but 
it was the advent of the gasoline internal combustion engine in the twilight of the 1800’s by Otto, 
Daimler, Benz and Maybach that marked the true dawn of the “horse-less” age. As the number and 
performance of horse-less carriages on public roadways increased, so too did the opposition towards 
them. 
 Risk management of automobiles was taking place well before the revolutionary advancement of the 
internal combustion engine. In the UK, an example of these measures was the Locomotive on Highways 
Act of 1865 often referred to as the "Red Flag Law" (Flink, 1988; Richardson and O'Gallagher, 1977). 
The Act stipulated that all self-propelled vehicles on public highways in country areas be limited to a 
maximum speed of four mph (two mph in towns) and that they be preceded by a man on foot carrying a 
red flag or lantern (Richardson and O'Gallagher, 1977).  
 The primary argument justifying the passing of the Act was the concern for the safety of other road 
users. However, it is interesting to note that the first widely-known automobile fatality did not occur until 
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1869 (Fallon and O'Neill, 2005), four years after the introduction of the Act. Ironically, the person fatally 
injured was a passenger of an automobile, the protection of whom was not the primary focus of the Act. It 
was not until August 1896, some 31 years after the introduction of the Act, that the first non-occupant 
fatality due to the operation of an automobile was recorded in the UK. Based on these facts, it could be 
argued that the passing of the Act was proactive in the safety-management of other road users. However, 
to further weaken the justification for the Act on the grounds of safety: the braking systems on early 
automobiles were superior to that of horse-drawn carriages and automobiles were not subject to the often 
unpredictable (Lee, 1998) and uncontrollable desires of a horse (Flink, 1988). So why did the Act pass? 
The true agenda behind the introduction of the Act were ‘hidden’ sociological, economical and political 
factors.  
 In the early-to-mid 1800’s, there was much resentment towards the presence of horse-less carriages 
on public roadways. The noisy and smelly machines often frightened horses which were used by the 
majority of other road users. The high cost of early-automobiles created an economic-divide in their 
ownership and consequently the general public viewed automobiles as merely a nuisance-toy for the rich. 
Automobiles also damaged the roadways, which had not been designed to accommodate such heavy and 
fast moving vehicles. In addition, it is likely the public’s limited knowledge and general inability to 
understand the complexities of automobile technologies contributed to an increased perception of the 
dangers. These factors and many more, created a general air of hostility towards automobiles. This 
hostility was used to the advantage of the true proponents behind the passing of the Act; those industries 
threatened by the prospect of a competing transportation technology (primarily the horse-drawn carriage, 
tram and rail industries (Flink, 1988; Setright, 2004)).  
 The passing of the “Red Flag Law” had significant ramifications for both the industry and the Society 
it was trying to protect. For more than 30 years the ‘discriminatory’ (Flink, 1988) Act ‘stultified’ (Flink, 
1988) the further development of the automobile in the UK, leaving the United States of America, France 
and Germany to reap the many benefits from pioneering in automobile technologies. 
 The Act was finally amended in 1878, removing the need for a red flag and reducing the distance a 
man should travel ahead of the automobile to 20 yards. However, this small relaxation came at a cost. The 
amended Act stipulated that the driver was required to stop the automobile at the sight of a horse and that 
the automobile should make no emissions in case it should frighten horses using the road. It was not until 
the passing of the Locomotives on High Ways Act of 1896, more than 30 years after the passing of the 
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“Red Flag Law”, that there was a significant relaxation granted to horse-less road users. The 1896 Act, 
commonly referred to as the “Emancipation Act”, recognised the growing use of automobiles as a means 
of personal transportation (Clapton, 2004) by establishing two categories of automobile: light locomotives 
and carriages, and those automobiles which exceeded three tonnes. Under the Emancipation Act, the 
maximum speed for light vehicles was raised to 14 mph and light vehicles were no longer required to be 
proceeded by a man on foot. This relaxation marked a turning point for the UK automobile industry and 
was celebrated by the “Emancipation Day” motorcar race between London and Brighton (Flink, 1988). 
 The next major development in regulations was the 1903 British Motor Car Act which introduced 
vehicle registration and driver licensing as well as penalties for recklessness, negligence or speeding. It 
was not until the 1930 Road Traffic Act that comprehensive regulations on the classification, 
construction, equipage, weight, driver licensing, insurance and guidance for road users (the Highway 
Code) were defined. This later Act forms the basis for modern automobile regulations in the UK.  
 In 2005, traffic accidents on Great Britain roads caused 3,201 fatalities and 28,954 serious injuries 
(DFT, 2006). More than 800 of these fatalities were other road users, pedestrians or cyclists. It cannot be 
assumed that all 800 of these fatalities were the result of an interaction with an automobile but with these 
figures in mind; there is debate as to whether current regulations are truly effective despite nearly a 
century and a half of progressive refinement. 
2.1  The “Horse-less Carriage” of the 21st Century?  
 Clear parallels can be drawn between the situation which faced “horse-less carriages” in the 1800’s 
and that which faces “pilot-less aircraft” today. A fully autonomous UAS essentially removes a 
component of an aircraft subject to error, the pilot, much in the same way the temperamental and 
unpredictable horse (Lee, 1998) was replaced by an engine.  
Before making further comparisons it is important to discuss one major difference between the risk 
paradigms of the two technologies. This is in the visibility of the benefits to Society. For automobiles the 
relationship between benefit and the primary individuals at risk (the occupants) is fairly apparent. 
However, for UASs the visibility of the benefits to the primary individuals at risk (people on the ground) 
is much more difficult to show. This difference has an impact on the acceptability of the risks to Society. 
However, in the early years of the automobile the immediate benefits of the industry were not as apparent 
as they are today. The public’s tolerance of the risks changed markedly when automobiles became 
recognised as a viable form of personal transportation. Therefore, comparisons can still be made between 
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the regulatory process as applied to early automobiles and that of the regulatory process applied to UASs 
today. However, in today’s risk aware Society, addressing the broader issues concerning the acceptability 
of the risks of UAS operations may prove a much more significant challenge. 
Analogous to the introduction of automobiles to public roadways, UASs are a new user within the 
National Airspace System (NAS); an established system designed to meet the needs of Human-Piloted 
Aircraft (HPA) (DeGarmo, 2004). The introduction of UASs to this system creates an entirely new risk 
management paradigm and this has potential ramifications on: 
1. The safety-performance of the NAS (e.g. changes in the level of risks to other airspace users) 
2. The efficiency of the NAS (e.g. increased complexity and congestion) 
3. The NAS environment (e.g. increased contrails, emissions and noise) 
UASs compete with existing NAS users for their relative contribution to the three factors listed 
above. The UAS industry is also a commercial competitor to existing NAS users in a number of 
applications. Similar to the regulation of early automobiles, these factors and a range of other political, 
social and economic factors, will influence (either directly or indirectly) the development of safety policy. 
Ideally, the development of such policy should be governed by the risks presented to Society, independent 
of such influences. 
The primary risks to Society due to the operation of UASs are those associated with the hazards of 
midair collision and a discontinuance of flight over a populated region (JAA/EUROCONTROL 2004; 
Brunet et al., 2004). These hazards present a risk to people onboard other aircraft and to people and 
property on the ground, respectively (JAA/EUROCONTROL 2004; Brunet et al., 2004; Clothier and 
Walker, 2006; Grimsley, 2004). The following sections discuss the current and proposed regulation 
strategies for the management of these two hazards, and the potential ramifications these strategies have 
on industry and Society. 
2.1.1 The Risks to Other Airspace Users 
 Integration into the NAS requires UASs to demonstrate, at minimum, an equivalent see-and-avoid 
capability to that currently provided by a pilot onboard a conventional aircraft. As described in (CASA, 
1988; ICAO, 1990), the see-and-avoid function requires the pilot, under suitable visibility conditions, to 
maintain a visual lookout for other aircraft and if necessary, initiate manoeuvres to avoid a potential 
collision scenario. The responsibility for collision avoidance ultimately resides with the pilot, irrespective 
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of any third party separation services (e.g., those provided by air traffic control) or technology-based 
separation aids (e.g., Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System). 
 UASs currently lack a sense-and-avoid capability equivalent to the see-and-avoid function (CASA, 
2002; JAA/EUROCONTROL 2004; OSD, 2005). Until such a capability is available, the risks due to the 
hazard of a midair collision have been managed by placing restrictions on where UAS operations can take 
place. These restrictions include confining UAS operations to: volumes of airspace segregated from all 
other airspace users, volumes of airspace with known or controlled traffic distributions, or to volumes of 
airspace known to have extremely low traffic interactions (such as oceanic areas). In striking similarity to 
the requirement for an automobile to be preceded by a man on foot with a red flag; safety authorities may 
also require a UAS to remain under the continual visual surveillance of a human observer located in a 
chase aircraft or situated on the ground (FAA, 2008). Mandating such a requirement renders most non-
segregated UAS operations impractical and economically unviable.  
 The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) does not mandate an equivalent see-and-
avoid capability for civil/commercial UAS operations outside of segregated airspace. The CASA has 
adopted a receptive risk management policy open to a range of risk management approaches which can 
permit restricted access to the NAS. Whether a sense-and-avoid capability is required is at the discretion 
of the regulator who must assess, on a case-by-case basis, the acceptability of the level of residual risk 
presented to other airspace users. In the short-term the operational restrictions mandated by CASA are 
tolerated by the UAS operator. However, the routine and unrestricted access of UASs to the NAS is 
unlikely to come about until an equivalent sense-and-avoid capability has been developed.  
2.1.2 The Risks to People and Property on the Ground 
 A discontinuance of flight presents a risk to people, property, and other entities of value on the 
ground. In 2006, the first widely-known civilian fatality due to the operation of UASs was recorded when 
a UAS crashed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, killing one civilian and injuring three others (La 
Frachi, 2006). Unfortunately, as the number of UASs operating over populated regions continues to 
increase, so too will the frequency of such mishaps. 
 UASs currently exhibit mishap rates of up to two orders of magnitude greater than that exhibited by 
HPA (OSD, 2005). A major factor contributing to these high mishap rates is the low reliability of the 
system (which encompasses the airborne platform, communications links, ground control and ‘human’ 
elements (OSD, 2005; DeGarmo, 2004)). The limited mishap data available for UAS also cite human 
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factors, poor maintenance and operational procedures as other significant contributing factors (OSD, 
2004; Williams, 2004). In general, this high mishap rate can be attributed to a lack of airworthiness which 
is traditionally obtained through a body of prescriptive regulations (OSD, 2002). These regulations define 
the approved standards and procedures to which UASs should be designed, manufactured, maintained and 
operated. As it stands, no consensus has been reached on the definition of airworthiness regulations 
specific to UASs. In the absence of prescriptive airworthiness regulations, regulators have placed 
restrictions on the operation of UASs near populated regions and/or have mandated compliance to 
existing standards developed for HPA. 
 Conditions mandated under CASR Part 101 (CASA, 2002) permit some UAS operations in the NAS 
under certain operational restrictions. However, all UASs must be certificated against an approved body 
of standards in order to operate over a populated area (a requirement for many commercial applications). 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) currently requires all civil/commercial UASs to obtain 
certification against a suitable body of standards before approval for operations within the NAS will be 
considered (FAA, 2008). At this point in time, neither the FAA nor CASA have defined prescriptive 
standards specific for the certification of UASs. At the time of writing the only mechanism for 
civil/commercial UAS operations in the NAS is via a special certificate of airworthiness in the 
experimental category. Conditions under this certificate preclude operation for commercial reward and 
include substantial operational restrictions. These can include restrictions on the regions over-flown, on 
the minimum altitude of operations and the carriage of mitigation systems not currently prescribed for 
HPA (e.g., parachute systems). Effectively these restrictions make the commercial operation of UASs 
over inhabited regions impossible. 
No objective methodology justifying the application of restrictions is provided; subsequently the 
restrictions are mandated based on the perceived levels of risk for the operation. In addition there is much 
ambiguity in the regulations (e.g., CASR 101.025 - the definition of a “populous area” (CASA, 1998)) 
which leaves room for interpretation. These factors can lead to the inconsistent management of the risks. 
 One approach is to base prescriptive certification regulations for UASs on those mandated for HPA. 
However, the existing standards and regulatory framework for HPA may not address the unique 
economical, technical and operational aspects of the UAS risk paradigm. The primary concern behind the 
definition of the existing regulations is the protection of people onboard the aircraft, something no longer 
relevant to UASs. For HPA, system reliability requirements are largely considered independent of the 
© Copyright 2008 Reece Clothier - 10 - 
intended operation (Haddon and Whittaker, 2002) and are therefore considered a simple function of the 
“number of seats” onboard the aircraft. For UAS, the degree of risk is a function of both the system and 
the environment it operates in and thus the required level of dependability of a UAS cannot be considered 
independent of its intended operation. The existing “one size fits all” (McGeer et al., 1999) regulation that 
mandates a ‘blanket’ level of reliability, may not be the most effective approach for the regulation of 
UASs. This is particularly the case for small UASs or those UAS operations where the risks can be 
considered negligible (e.g., remote or oceanic areas etc). Existing regulations may not be applicable to 
UASs (e.g., requirements on crash-worthiness) and may not address unique elements of UASs (e.g., 
ground stations, flight termination systems and autonomous software systems etc). In addition, it may not 
be practicably possible, or economically feasible to certify some UASs to existing standards when 
considering the physical limitations of aircraft and the commercial drivers behind their applications, 
respectively.  
2.1.3 The Regulation of UAS; A “Red Flag” Policy? 
 Some stakeholders believe that UASs present an unacceptable risk to other airspace users and people 
and property on the ground.  As a result, safety regulators have put in place temporary and somewhat ad-
hoc measures to mitigate the perceived risks that, much like the “Red Flag Law”, lack objective 
justification. Where the regulations do not effectively preclude the operation of UAS altogether; they 
impose substantial restrictions. These restrictions have a significant impact on the business case 
supporting the application of UASs over competing technologies and prevent the operation of UASs in 
many widely-beneficial applications. 
However, one cannot critique the regulator too heavily. It is the regulator’s responsibility to ensure 
the safety of Society and it can be argued that the current regulations are more than satisfying this 
obligation. It could also be argued that the ‘precautionary’ (UN, 1992) measures in place are justifiable 
considering the general lack of objective knowledge of the risks of UAS operations that is available to 
regulators. With this in mind, it is important to remember that such precautionary measures should only 
remain whilst there is a lack of objective evidence to prove otherwise. 
 The slightly more receptive regulatory stance adopted by CASA is the envy of the UAS industry 
around the world. To some extent this more receptive approach is made possible because of the unique 
aspects of Australia’s operating environment; specifically the relatively empty skies and the distributed 
nature of its population. In the short term this receptive stance, like the stance adopted by France, USA 
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and Germany in the regulation of early automobiles, may allow Australia to capitalise on some segments 
of the developing UAS industry. However, this window of opportunity is closing. The current regulations 
are by no means a solution to the long-term needs of the industry. Ultimately, UASs require a degree of 
operational freedom within the NAS comparable to that of HPA. This will only come about through the 
development of effective regulatory policy that “regulates with respect to risk”.  
2.2 Thinking Beyond the Horse 
 The risk management of UAS operations within the NAS has been based on the high level 
requirements for transparency, compliance and equivalency to that of HPA operations 
(JAA/EUROCONTROL 2004). This immediately raises an important question: are these over-arching 
requirements valid? Should UASs be required to conform to the existing risk management system or 
should a new system be developed with all users in mind? Arguments supporting the former include:  
1. UASs represent a small proportion of airspace users 
2. There is much maturity in the current system which delivers an acceptable level of safety   
 To address the first of these arguments, like automobiles in the 1800’s, UASs currently constitute 
only a small fraction of airspace users and thus have very little sway when compared to that of the 
revenue generating passenger and freight transportation industries. However, it is likely that this scenario 
will change as regulations evolve and the business cases supporting the UASs market strengthen. After 
all, it only took automobiles just over a century to revolutionise Society’s concept of transportation, a 
concept which had been instilled for thousands of years.  
 Secondly, the current airspace system was designed around the performance of a human pilot (e.g., 
see-and-avoid, visual/instrument flight rules etc). Forcing UASs to conform to this system may do more 
harm than good. A notable proportion of the accidents attributed to automobiles were due to the fact they 
were forced to use narrow roadways designed for a smaller number of slower road users (Granville-Edge, 
1926). It was not until 1906, approximately 40 years after the ”Red Flag Law”, that regulators 
acknowledged that in order to ensure the continued safety and convenience of pedestrians (due to the 
proliferation of automobiles), it would require the regulation of pedestrian traffic (Ishaque and Noland, 
2006). Inevitably, the existing road system and its users were required to accommodate automobiles for 
the safety and efficiency of all.  
 Guiding principles such as compliance and equivalency to existing practices, standards and 
regulatory frameworks may preclude the exploration of safer and more efficient long-term risk 
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management systems. Thus the entire regulatory and airspace systems should be re-evaluated with a 
‘shared’ operating concept in mind. UASs are a fundamentally new aviation technology, the effective 
regulation of which may require a fundamentally new approach. However, despite the perceived urgency 
in the need for regulations, stakeholders should proceed with caution. The promulgation of ineffectual or 
inappropriate regulations could present an even greater challenge to the UAS industry than the 
precautionary regulations currently in place. 
 The historical comparison highlights recurring issues in the risk management of new technologies. In 
particular: the concept of safety and its management will always embody divergent perspectives and 
elements of subjectivity, potentially leading to the inappropriate or the ineffective management of the 
risks. Therefore the decision making process should focus on the communication of rational and objective 
arguments. It is important to note that such a focus does not guarantee stakeholder consensus or the 
broader acceptance of a new technology. However, such a focus does support decision making more 
resilient to such influencing factors. The following section discusses one possible approach supporting 
such resilience, through the application of philosophies used in systems engineering and design.  
3. An Engineering Design Perspective 
In 2003, controversial and broad changes were proposed in the management of regional airports in 
Australia, summarised in (CASA, 2004). Utilising principles drawn from engineering design, 
stakeholders for Broome International Airport provided a rational argument justifying a range of 
alternative risk management proposals (Emery et al., 2005). The arguments put forward overcame the 
many political and external influences; resulting in changes to the proposed regulations (CASA, 2005). 
This example highlights the potential benefits of the application of engineering design principles to the 
Risk Management Decision Making Process (RMDMP). The following section (§3.1) explores the 
application of these principles within the context of the UAS RMDMP. These principles are then applied 
to a case-study decision scenario (§3.2). 
3.1 The Decision Making Process and the General Systems Hierarchy 
The definition of a regulatory framework is the outcome of a RMDMP; a process analogous to the 
decision making process in engineering design. Mistree et al.(1990) observes that decisions in 
engineering design are: 
1. Invariably multi-levelled and multi-dimensional in nature, 
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2. Involve multiple sources of information from varying disciplines, and are 
3. Governed by multiple measures of performance and merit. 
4. That the decision space is often open, and  
5. That there is often no singular, unique or optimum solution to any single decision problem 
Mistree et al., (1990) also observes that the information required for decision making: 
1. May be scientific (hard, objective) or subjective (soft, judgemental), and 
2. May not always be available 
Based on the observations above, there are many similarities between the challenges faced in 
decision making in engineering design and those currently facing the RMDMP for UASs and this section 
formally describes the application of this approach. 
3.1.1 The UAS Risk Management Decision Making Process – A Black Box System? 
Systems theory is most often applied in the management and design of complex technological 
systems or processes. A system is defined as: 
 “A set of interrelated components which interact with one another in an organized fashion 
towards a common purpose.” (Shishko and Chamberlain, 1995) 
 The RMDMP can also be described as a system. The components of a system can comprise people, 
organisations, facilities, equipment, product or resources, and in the case of the RMDMP for UASs, these 
components interact with the objective of establishing regulations acceptable to all stakeholders. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the interactions and components which comprise the RMDMP are 
uncertain. Therefore, the entire process could be considered a black box system; a system where the inner 
workings are hidden from the outside observer, Fig. 1. The UAS RMDMP could be considered even less 
observable than a black box system. This is because all of the inputs to the decision process are not 
entirely known. As a consequence, it may not be possible to completely characterise the system based on 
the observation of its outputs alone. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Black box representation of the Risk Management Decision Making Process (RMDMP) 
 
n decision 
inputs 
Risk Management 
Decision Making 
Process ƒ(         ) Safety Policy Outputs 
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 There needs to be transparency in the RMDMP in order for stakeholders to have confidence in the 
objectivity and integrity of safety policies mandated. Ideally this process would be described as a “white 
box” system; where the interactions between internal components are completely visible to the outside 
observer and thus the relationship between the inputs (the risks, benefits and costs) and the outputs (safety 
policy) are comprehensibly known. However, the RMDMP will always involve stakeholder discourse and 
will always be subject to the influences of stakeholder perceptions and desires, and the political, social 
and economical climate the entire process occurs in. Thus attainment of a “white box” process may be an 
unrealisable objective. A more realistic objective is not to strive for complete transparency in the 
RMDMP but to move from opacity to a degree of translucency.   
3.1.2 Moving from Opacity to Translucency 
 Boulding’s (Boulding, 1956) General Hierarchy of Systems (GHoS) is a multi-disciplinary theory 
describing the theoretical arrangement of abstracted systems based on the complexity of fundamental 
phenomena. Any RMDMP essentially comprises a hierarchy of knowledge and decisions, and therefore 
can be described in terms of the different levels of the GHoS.  
 The GHoS describes a “system of systems”. Within the context of a RMDMP this is where decisions 
made at higher levels of the hierarchy will ultimately translate to systems residing at lower levels within 
the hierarchy. For example, decisions with regard to the safety of UASs (a concept at the level of social 
sciences) will translate to standards and procedures relating to the dependability of UASs, their operation 
and custodianship (the levels of physical sciences: frameworks, clockworks and thermostats). Systems at 
the level of physical sciences are the ultimate ‘subjects’ of the outputs from the RMDMP. A RMDMP 
described in this manner follows a top-down or deductive process.  
 Our understanding and ability to characterise processes residing within the social levels of the GHoS 
is limited. As a consequence it is difficult to show traceability between the decisions made at these upper 
levels (e.g., the requirement for an equivalent level of safety (CASA, 2002; JAA/EUROCONTROL 2004; 
CAA, 2004; OSD, 2005) to the requirements at lower levels (e.g., standards on the design of UASs).  
 One of the advantages in viewing the RMDMP from the perspective of Boulding’s GHoS is that it 
also supports a “bottom up” approach. A “bottom up” approach utilises the wealth of theoretical 
knowledge and data at the lower levels of the GHoS (the levels of physical sciences) to provide a better 
understanding of the behaviour of systems that reside in the upper tiers of the GHoS (the uncertain levels 
of social sciences). Specifically, the objective measure of the risks and their relationship to physical 
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technological systems and operational environments can be used to establish rational constraints and 
bounds on the Risk Management Decision Space (RMDS). 
3.1.3 Establishing a Rational Decision Space (RDS) 
 It is common in engineering design scenarios for physical limitations in the systems to manifest 
themselves as constraints and bounds on a design space (Mistree et al., 1990). These constraints and 
bounds can be used to establish a “feasible design space” (Mistree et al., 1990). This feasible design 
space is separate from the “aspiration design space” which is defined by the goals of the design process 
(Mistree et al., 1990). Decision-Based Design (DBD) principles characterise the feasible design space by: 
1. Bounds – the physical limits on input criteria: e.g., the finite amount of resources available for 
risk mitigation, or the maximum observable consequence for a particular hazard etc. 
2. Constraints – relationships between input criteria: e.g., the relationship between cost of 
mitigation strategies and the level of residual risk, or the relationship between the takeoff weight 
and operating range for an aircraft etc. 
…(Mistree et al., 1990) 
 A “Rational Decision Space” (RDS) analogous to the “feasible design space” in engineering design 
problems can be defined within the Risk Management Decision Space (RMDS) by identifying the bounds 
and constraints of objective decision-input criteria. An example two dimensional RMDS is illustrated in 
Fig. 2. The RDS in Fig. 2. is defined by the region enclosed by the bounds (xmin, xmax, ymin, ymax) and 
constraints (C1, C2). 
 
Fig. 2 Rational Decision Space in a 2-dimensional Risk Management Decision Space  
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3.1.3.1 The Risk Management Decision Space (RMDS) 
The Risk Management Decision Space (RMDS) is the n-dimensional space defined by the n inputs to 
the RMDMP. As stated previously, not all of the inputs to the RMDMP are known or can be objectively 
characterised. However, studies in the field of risk management and social sciences have indicated that 
decisions made in relation to the acceptability of risks are a function of the perceived level of risk to 
entities of value to society, the potential benefits received in return for the hazardous activity, and the 
costs incurred in managing the risks (e.g., Starr et al., 1976). Therefore objective inputs to the RMDP for 
UASs would need to be defined in each of these three areas. The scope of this identification process 
should include numerous stakeholder perspectives (e.g., the risks the loss of a UAS has from the 
perspective of the UAS operator). 
3.1.3.2 Bounds and Constraints 
 Bounds represent the limits on input criteria and can be established through formal risk analysis. The 
risk analysis process can draw on formal risk techniques, empirical data, modelling and expert judgement 
to identify and characterise boundaries and constraints between input criteria. In the context of 
establishing boundaries for the RDS, the objective of a risk assessment is to determine the potential range 
inputs to the RMDMP can take. Establishing the extremes of the risk scenario is a much easier problem to 
solve, as often the solution can be found within fundamental knowledge of physical sciences (GHoS – the 
realms of frameworks, clockworks and thermostats).  
 A constraint represents a relationship between input criteria which is required to be satisfied. At the 
levels of physical sciences, these constraints take the form of simple theoretical and analytical 
relationships, for example: fundamental theories in aerodynamics or physics.  
 A similar approach could be used to establish boundaries and constraints for the benefits of UAS 
operations (e.g. the use of economic studies (Zaloga et al., 2007)). 
3.1.3.3 The Rational Decision Space (RDS) 
 The RDS is formed by the Cartesian product over the domain of input criteria.  The design space is 
formed by setting the bounds and constraints of each individual decision input criterion (Fulton, 2002). 
The bounds and constraints serve as ‘fences of logic and rationality’ within which the subjective (and 
uncertain) decision function, ƒ, can move freely. Any decision scenario that resides outside these fences 
is driven by subjective or hidden inputs and must lie in the aspiration space of the stakeholders. Careful 
consideration should be given to the plausibility of such scenarios. 
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An example RMDS is shown in Fig. 3A. In some instances it may not be possible to establish all of 
the boundaries on the RDS. In such scenarios one or more dimensions of the RMDS may be open or 
unconstrained, as illustrated in Fig. 3B. Decisions across this dimension are often restricted by the needs 
or desires of the stakeholders (the aspiration space, refer §3.1.3.3). Not all boundaries or constraints can 
be evaluated with absolutely certainty. The level of certainty in a boundary or constraint depends on the 
mechanism/process and underlying data used in their evaluation. For example: boundaries or constraints 
established with a sound basis in theoretical lore (e.g., the formula for kinetic energy) or using absolute 
measures (e.g., maxima of a finite resource) will have a high degree of associated certainty. In order for 
decision makers to have confidence in the RDS, margins of uncertainty should be provided, as illustrated 
in Fig. 3C. 
3.1.3.4 The Aspiration Space  
 The Aspiration Space (AS) is a region in the RMDS that reflects the desired states of the system, as 
illustrated in Fig. 3D. Unlike the RDS, it may not be possible to derive the boundaries of the AS in an 
entirely traceable and objective manner. Instead the bounds can be driven by perceptions, preferences 
and/or other processes residing in the social tiers of Boulding’s GHoS. Thus, an AS may not necessarily 
intersect the RDS, as illustrated in Fig. 3D.  
Rational aspirations or Feasible Goals (FG) are those stakeholder aspirations which are transferable 
to realistic requirements on physical systems and operations, and reside in the region of intersection 
between an AS and RDS, Fig.3E.  
Each stakeholder has unique preferences, goals and perceptions and subsequently, will have a unique 
region of aspirations within the RMDS. In cases where there is no common ground between stakeholder 
aspirations (as illustrated in Fig.3F), the decision function, ƒ, should undertake a process of compromises 
within the bounds of the RDS. A Region of Consensus (ROC) is formed where there is some agreement 
between stakeholders (the regions of intersection between two or more ASs, as illustrated in Fig. 3G). 
The ideal decision scenario would be to have stakeholder consensus (a ROC) which intersects the RDS 
thus defining a region of Feasible Goals (FGs), Fig. 3H. 
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Fig. 3. Example RMDS scenarios. (A) RDS formed by constraints and bounds. (B) RDS without upper 
bound. (C) RDS with uncertainty in bounds. (D) RMDS with one Aspiration Space (AS1) outside the 
bounds of the RDS. (E) RMDS with region of Feasible Goals (FG). (F) RMDS with two aspiration 
spaces (AS1, AS2) in contention. (G) RMDS with two aspiration spaces (AS1, AS2) and a Region of 
Consensus (ROC). (H) RMDS illustrating regions of FG (solid black line) and ROC (dashed black line). 
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3.2 Case-Study Scenario 
 The purpose of this case-study is to illustrate how the application of the perspective described in 
the previous section can assist the RMDMP. Many details and assumptions have been omitted in order to 
provide a concise example and thus any quantitative figures are purely illustrative. 
Consider a theoretical decision scenario where a level of system reliability for a small UAS needs to 
be determined for a mission over an inhabited area. The UAS under consideration is loosely based on the 
Raven™ RQ-11B (Aerovironment, 2006). It is assumed that the UAS is operating over an area which has 
a uniformly distributed population density of 26.7 inhabitants per square kilometre. This is the average 
density for an “inner regional” area in Queensland, Australia (ABS, 2004). 
3.2.1 Defining the Decision Space 
 The required level of system reliability is driven by the level of risk the UAS presents to the 
territories over-flown (people, property, environment etc). For this scenario, only one domain of 
consequence is considered, the consequence to human life and this is expressed in terms of the expected 
number of human casualties per flight hour of operation. The casualty expectation criterion (proposed by 
(JAA/EUROCONTROL, 2004) and (Grimsley, 2004)) is used purely for illustrative purposes, and is not 
recommended as a sole-metric for describing the risk of UAS operations. The other decision input 
variable is the System Loss Rate (SLR) per flight hour. A two-dimensional RMDS can be defined with 
the x-axis corresponding to the SLR and the y-axis corresponding to the casualty expectation.  
3.2.2 Boundaries 
Independent of any other factors, there is no theoretical limit on the minimum reliability of the UAS 
and therefore the RDS has no upper bound with respect to the SLR. However, it is unlikely a UAS 
manufacturer would design a system with a level of reliability less than that of the baseline system. The 
baseline SLR (assumed as 0.04 per hour) is used as the upper boundary (indicated in Fig. 4. with a 
vertical dotted green line).  
Improvements in system reliability (reductions in the SLR) can be achieved through robustness in 
design, assurance, maintenance and operational practices. Ultimately the minimal practicably obtainable 
SLR, independent of any cost factors, is restricted by the physical and performance limitations of the 
UAS platform (i.e., available volume, mass, power etc) and the current availability of key technologies. 
For many UAS, it is not practicably possible to mitigate all single points of failure within the system, and 
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still have it capable of carrying a usable payload. Limitations in key technologies can also be used to 
define boundaries on the RMDS. One example is the propulsion system which is a key single-point of 
failure in many UASs (OSD, 2003). Increasing advancements in key technologies will tend to shift 
technology-driven boundaries to the left (reducing the SLR), increasing the size of the RDS. 
 It is assumed that the size and performance of the small UAS under consideration and the availability 
of alternative technologies would limit potential improvements in the SLR to a factor of ten below that of 
the SLR of the baseline system. This is shown as a purple vertical line (dash-dot) in Fig.4.  
Rational bounds on the casualty expectation (represented on the y-axis of Fig. 4.) can be determined 
by looking at the ability of the UAS to inflict damage to people on the ground.  
The casualty expectation is a complex function of the SLR, failure modes of the UAS, distribution of 
people exposed (in space and time) and the conditional probability that a person struck by the UAS is 
injured. To establish the minimum and maximum of this complex relationship, two extreme cases were 
examined using the simple casualty expectation formula presented in (Montgomery and Ward, 1995). 
The minimum boundary on the casualty expectation is summarised in Eq.1. Using inert-debris injury 
curves (RCC, 2002; Lin et al., 2003), it can be observed that the kinetic energy of the candidate UAS in 
its minimal operational configuration (e.g., stall speed and lowest take-off weight) is highly unlikely to 
cause a fatal injury to a person (a probability of a fatal injury on the order of 0.02). A minimum lethal 
area of 1.4 m2 was calculated for a vertical failure mode. Substituting the minimum practicably obtainable 
SLR of 0.004 per flight hour into Eq.1, the minimum boundary on the casualty expectation can be 
calculated as 3x10-09 fatalities per flight hour (illustrated in Fig.4 as a horizontal (dash-double-dot) black 
line). 
Equation 1 
 
SLR.)SLR(CE
)strike|fatalityPr(LASLR)SLR(CE
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minminmin
××=
×××=
−071067
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The equation for the maximum boundary on the casualty expectation is summarised below in Eq.2. 
The maximum boundary on the casualty expectation was calculated assuming maximum kinetic energy 
under a maximum operational configuration (max speed and weight). The probability of a fatality given a 
strike was calculated as 0.93 and the maximum lethal area (under a gliding failure mode) was calculated 
as 31m2. Using the baseline SLR, the maximum boundary on the casualty expectation was calculated as 
3.08x10-05 (illustrated in Fig.4 as a dashed horizontal green line). 
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Equation 2 
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3.2.3 Constraints 
 The minima and maxima constraints on the casualty expectation can be determined by evaluating 
Eq.1 and Eq.2, across the entire domain of the SLR (illustrated in Fig.4 by the solid diagonal red line and 
by the solid diagonal blue line, respectively). 
3.2.4 Defining the Rational Decision Space 
 A RDS is formed by the region bounded by the minima and maxima constraints and the boundaries 
of the two input criteria, illustrated in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4 Formulation of the RDS  
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3.2.5 Defining the Aspiration Space 
 For this case study it is assumed that there are only three stakeholder groups involved in the 
RMDMP:  
1. the UAS manufacturer/operator,  
2. the aviation safety regulatory authority, and  
3. the general public. 
3.2.5.1 The UAS Manufacturer/Operator 
 It is assumed that the aspirations of the UAS Manufacturer/Operator are purely commercial in nature 
and thus the maximum commercially viable SLR (independent of any mandatory regulatory 
requirements) is driven by the costs of system attrition, insurance and deployment (transportation, 
maintenance, personnel etc). These costs must be kept to a minimum relative to the financial return from 
the successful completion of the mission. This simple economic relationship is described in Eq.3. 
Equation 3 
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where: 
RPHr – Customer service rate per hour of operation (assumed fixed at $2 000 an hour) 
CPHr  – Costs per hour of operation 
SLR   – System Loss Rate (assumed baseline rate of 0.04) 
SC  – Initial system cost (assumed as $35 000 per air vehicle which increases by $10 000 
for every order of magnitude improvement by reduction in the SLR from the baseline 
rate) 
DC   – Deployment cost per hour of operation (assumed as $300 per hour) 
CE  – Casualty expectation per hour of operation 
IC   – Third party insurance (assumed actuarial cost per fatal injury of $1M) 
 This simple model assumes that improvements can be made in the reliability of the system through 
economic investment (not limited by the availability of technologies) and that the customer will pay a 
fixed price per hour of operation irrespective of the SLR. 
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 A plot of the economic model described by Eq.3 is provided in Fig. 5. The magnitude of the 
independent variables of the IC (dotted black line), SC (dash-dot purple line), and the RPHr (dashed red 
line) are shown in Fig. 5. The total CPHr as per Eq.3 is represented in Fig. 5 by a solid blue line. 
 It can be observed in Fig. 5 that the cost of system attrition (the SC) dominates the CPHr and not the 
actuarial costs of insuring against a third party casualty. This is due to the extremely low risk of a casualty 
resulting from an in-flight loss of the system. As the SLR decreases the CPHr approaches that of the DC 
($300 per hour). The point of minimum commercial viability is the point where the CPHr equals that of 
the PRHr. This point occurs when the SLR is less than or equal to 5x10-02 per flight hour. It is assumed 
that the region of commercial viability defines the AS of the UAS manufacturer/operator.  
 
Fig. 5. Economic model driving UAS manufacturer/operator aspirations 
 
3.2.5.2 The Aviation Safety Regulatory Authority 
 In keeping with the current regulatory authority standpoint on proposed UAS reliability requirements, 
the regulator is likely to adopt a ‘blanket’ reliability requirement. Paragraph 9.b.(3) of AC-23.1309 (FAA, 
1999) describes the process used for deriving the system reliability requirements for different system 
failure condition categories. The allowable average probability per flight hour of a hazardous system 
© Copyright 2008 Reece Clothier - 24 - 
failure condition (a failure of the system potentially resulting in a serious injury or fatality) is between 
1x10-06 and 1x10-05 per flight hour (FAA, 1999). Arbitrarily assuming that there are ten potentially 
hazardous system failure conditions for the small UAS (a similar assumption is made for catastrophic 
failure conditions in (FAA, 1999)), then the requirements for the overall SLR of the UAS must be 
between 1x10-05 and 1x10-04 per flight hour. These requirements define the boundaries of the AS for the 
aviation safety regulatory authority and are shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Aspiration Space of the aviation safety regulatory authority 
 
3.2.5.3 The General Public 
 Characterising Society’s perception of the risks is a complex task and is the subject of much research, 
e.g., refer to (Slovic, 1987) and (Starr et al., 1976). For the purposes of this scenario, it is assumed that 
Society will not tolerate a level of risk more than that which is currently observed for HPA (i.e., an 
equivalent level of risk). A casualty expectation of 3.13x10-08 involuntarily-exposed ground fatalities per 
flight hour was determined for HPA air carrier operations in the US (Clothier and Walker, 2006). No 
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minimum boundary is defined in order to reflect Society’s ultimate desire for “zero risk”. The AS for the 
general public is illustrated in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig.7. Aspiration space of the general public 
 
 The combined ASs of all three stakeholder groups is illustrated in Fig. 8. A ROC is formed where all 
three ASs intersect (illustrated in Fig. 8 as the hatched region bordered by a black dashed line). This is the 
region of the RMDS where the goals of all stakeholders are in agreement and a solution to the RMDMP 
can be reached with minimum conflict in stakeholder objectives. 
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Fig. 8. The combined ASs of all three stakeholder groups 
3.2.6 Summarising the Decision Space 
 The RMDMP can be characterised by the combination of the RDS and the ASs, illustrated in Fig. 9. 
A region of Feasible Goals (FGs) is illustrated as the area enclosed by a black dotted line. The ROC lies 
completely outside the bounds of the RDS, thus there are no FGs within the RMDS that meets the desires 
of all three stakeholder groups. Thus, like many decisions problems involving multiple stakeholders, a 
process of compromise is needed. However, a region of FGs is formed where the ASs of both the general 
public and the UAS manufacturer/operator intersect with the RDS, depicted as the black solid-shaded 
region in Fig. 9. In this region, the risk management is practically realisable, meets the economic desires 
of the UAS industry and satisfies the public’s desire for protection based on a comparative benchmark to 
the risks of HPA.  
It can be observed that the AS of the regulator does not intersect the RDS at any point in the RMDS. 
The SLR requirements mandated under existing regulations for HPA are not realisable (i.e., lie outside 
the bounds of the RDS) in their application to the case study UAS operation. This is because of the 
practical and physical limitations of the UAS (e.g.: maximum take-off weight, available power etc – 
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factors in the realms of physical sciences). The SLR requirements are mandated independent of the 
operating environment (i.e., they have no direct relationship to the operating environment and thus the 
casualty expectation for the particular operation). This case study illustrates the disadvantages of using 
the existing certification approach of mandating blanket system reliability requirements. Effective 
regulation must acknowledge the shift of primary risks to entities external to the system.  
 
Fig. 9. Case study decision space 
3.3 Summary 
 This section has discussed the application of systems engineering and DBD philosophies to the 
characterisation of a RMDMP. 
 The proposed approach supports informed decision making through objective reasoning whilst 
acknowledging the inherently subjective nature of the concept of risk and the RMDP. Boulding’s GHoS 
provides the theory to support a bottom up approach to the characterisation of the RMDS despite the 
absence of a complete understanding of the RMDMP. A bottom up approach capitalises on the wealth of 
knowledge of fundamental theories in the underlying physical systems to partition the RMDS into 
objective (the RDS) and subjective (the AS) regions. This ensures objective inputs to the RMDMP are 
independent of the subjective goals representing the preferences and beliefs of stakeholder groups. The 
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decision function, ƒ, remains a subjective process of stakeholder discourse, however the risk decision 
plane is no longer without bounds. Decision makers now have objective boundaries describing a set of 
rational and justifiable policy decisions. Not only does this provide greater transparency in the RMDMP 
but this approach provides information on the dynamics of the decision scenario, facilitating more 
effective communication and resource allocation strategies. 
 The case study demonstrated how even simple analysis can benefit the RMDMP and highlighted the 
potential challenges in adopting a “one sized fits all” regulatory approach for UASs. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 A lot can be learnt from the experiences of the past. Many parallels can be drawn between the risk 
management of “horse-less carriages” in the 1800’s and that of “pilot-less aircraft” today. Based on this 
comparison it is evident that many of the issues concerning the effective risk management of new 
technologies are still prevalent, despite the passing of more than 150 years.  
 With respect to the development of suitable regulatory policy for UASs, stakeholders should explore 
all possible solutions in a systematic and objective manner. It is acknowledged that in the interim it is 
“better to be safe than sorry” but such precautionary management strategies should only prevail in the 
absence of an analytical appreciation of the risks. It is also acknowledged that a complete analytical 
appreciation of the risks currently does not exist and thus there is need for research into the development 
of tools to support risk-informed decision making.  
 With more revolutionary aviation technologies on the horizon (e.g., personal air vehicles, routine 
sub-orbital and hypersonic aircraft), aviation regulators will need to overcome many of the recurring 
challenges in the development of regulations for new technologies. One proposed approach that could be 
used to help address these recurring issues may lie in the application of systems engineering and design 
philosophies. Whilst attaining an entirely objective and “white box” RMDMP may not be a realistic 
possibility, decision makers should instead look to utilise tools which add to the transparency of the 
RMDMP. It is hoped that such tools will help to ensure that “Red Flag” policies remain only as lessons in 
history. 
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